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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
The Purpose of Study
Hyundai Motor Company, which is the biggest automobile 
company in South Korea, set up Hyundai Motor America as its 
marketing agent in Los Angeles in April, 1985, and sells its cars 
under its own brand name in the U.S. market. Daewoo Motor 
Company, the second largest automaker in South Korea, is 
preparing to ship to the U.S. as many as 100,000 units annually 
of a new GM subcompact known as LeMans to be sold as a Pontiac 
brand beginning in January 1987.
The major objective of this paper is to examine the 
motivations and the strategies of the two Korean motor companies 
in the U.S. auto market. The two big Korean motor companies have 
totally different strategies and different motivations in the 
U.S. market. Hyundai is very independent in marketing 
activity. For instance, it uses its own brand(Hyundai) in the 
U.S. market- Daewoo, however, sells its cars as a Pontiac 
brand. This company is heavily dependent upon General Motors in 
marketing and technology and is 50 percent owned by GM. Daewoo 
Motor Company enters the U.S. market under the control of General 
Motors.
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The Scope of Study
This research discusses the strategies and the 
motivations of the two big Korean motor companies in the 
U.S. market. The paper also deals with the problems the Korean 
motor companies have in the United States as well as how the 
Korean automakers affect the U.S. auto market. Japanese motor 
companies have already conceded a share of the U.S. auto market 
to the Koreans, but retaliation from Japanese motor companies is 
expected. As a matter of fact, Hyundai Motor Company imports 
major components from Mitsubishi Motors. If Mitsubishi stops 
exporting the components to South Korea, Hyundai will not be able 
to survive in the U.S. auto market. Similarly, Daewoo is 
dependent upon GM in every aspect. Without the assistance of G M , 
Daewoo Motor Company cannot sell its cars in the United States. 
The future of the Korean motor companies is also
studied. Potential problems and the future business environment 
are examined.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER I I
KOREAN CULTURE
Korean people share a common racial origin with other 
peoples of North Asia, and the Korean language belongs to the 
Altic language family of the region.
The Korean culture has been strong 1y affected by Chinese 
culture since the Three Kingdoms Period(57 BC - 668 AD). The 
early Korean people were in constant confrontation with Chinese 
people. China was antagonistic toward the northern peoples» with 
whom the Koreans were assoc i ated.  ̂ Korea’s formation and 
development were nurtured in its struggles with China.
Manchuria and Mongolia came under successive control of 
the northern nomadic people and served as a basis for the 
invasion of Korea and China- In order to cope with this threat, 
Korea and China felt the need for a military alliance.
There is strong cultural homogeneity between Korea and 
China. Since the Iron Age, China and Korea have developed 
agricultural economies and thus shared many cultural 
similarities. Korea absorbed Chinese written characters, laws, 
and Confucianism. Korea, however, invented its own alphabet and 
its own language. Korea developed its own way of culture and 
adapted and improved upon all its borrowed culture to fit its own 
needs.
By the late 19th century, Japan took the leading position
^Encvclopedia Britannica, Vol. 10, 1983, P. 506.
3
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in North East Asia. Korea was annexed to Japan in 1910. Korea 
fell prey to Japanese imperialism» which took advantage of reform 
movements in Korea for its own benefit until Japan surrendered to 
the United States in 1945. After the liberation from Japanese 
rule, Korea was divided into two parts-North and South. (* In 
this paper "Korea" will be used to signify South Korea.)
The per capita income during the Korean war(1950-1953> in 
South Korea was $57. The current per capita GNP is over 
$2,000. There are several reasons for the rapid growth. First, 
Korea has strong centralized governmental control. The economic 
plan was executed by the strong government very efficiently. The 
real situation in the Korean economy demonstrates that the 
government has been able to control the private sector to a 
degree that would be tolerated in few capitalistic societies. The 
Korean government excerc i ses that control by manipulating 
virtually all institutional credit for businesses and rural 
development, setting export and import quotas, encouraging 
monopolistic practices in certain industries, and maintaining the 
ability to hire and fire the leadership of critical private 
companies.
Second, Confucianism has played an important role in 
Korea's economic development. Only 30 years ago, the Confuc i an 
heritage was regarded in western academic circles as a deterrant 
to economic growth.^’ In 1970, President Park Chung-Hee stressed
^"The Universaiist Myth," Foreign Service Journal, June, 
1986, P. 39-
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Confuc i an educational values and revived the concept of loyalty 
to the state. The primary benefit that Confuc i an tradition 
brought Korea was that, although it is sometimes simplistically 
characterized as pragmatic, it neverth1 ess effectively prevented 
the development of powerful, conservative religious groups that 
might have retarded developmental i nno vat ion .
Third, Korea has created a highly literate labor 
force. Confuc ian society stressed the importance of
education. Public demand for education in Korea exceeds all other 
priorities. Confucianism invented the meritocratic bureaucracy, 
based upon the concept of advancement through an examination 
system that rewarded competence as defined by the culture.
Fourth, the ethnic unity is the most distinct feature of 
Korea. Korea is the only developing country in Asia, and perhaps 
one of the few in the world, that has no significant minority 
group. Korea has not had to cope with problems such as those of 
overseas Chinese in Indonesia, the Tamils in Sri Lanka, or the 
myriad minorities of Burma.
Korea’s success results from the complex combination of 
factors mentioned above. There is not only the Confuc i an ethic 
itself, but also ethnic unity and education.
3 Ibid
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CHAPTER I I I
GROWTH OF THE KOREAN ECONOMY
After World War II, Korea was liberated from Japan. As 
soon as the country became independent, it had to experience the 
Korean W ar<1950— 1953). After the Korean War the Korean economy 
became an open dualist ic economy of the labor surplus 
type. Traditional agriculture coexisted with the nonagricultural 
sectors without any contact between the two.
Since Korea has limited land and few natural resources, 
internat ional trade plays an important role in the national 
economy. Therefore, the Korean economy had to be opened 
internationally. In the agricultural sector, the ratio of land 
per person was very low and the population grew very quickly, 
thereby resulting in a rapid increase in unemployment. As a 
result, the Korean economy became a labor surplus type. In this 
situation, the task of the Korean economy was to transfer the 
unemployed labor force from the agricultural sector to the 
nonagricultral sector. To do so could increase the level of 
employment and the Gross National Income.
Actual economic growth began in 1955. The critical turning 
point was 1965. There are two periods in Korean economic 
development. The first one is the Import Substitution Growth 
period and the second one is the Export Substitution Growth
'^Jo, Sung-Hwan, Introduction to Economics. Seoul : Bakyoung 
Publishing Company, 1981, P. 399.
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p e r i o d .»
Import Substitution Growth Period(1955-1965)
After the armistice of the Korean W ar(1953), Korean 
economic development was led by the activity of the import 
substitution in consumer goods. Professor Jo, Sung-Hwan, who is a 
professor of Sogang Uni versi ty (Seou1, Korea), described major 
charac ter i st ics of the Korean economy during the Import 
Substitution Growth period.
All activities of manufacturing were domestic market 
oriented. Manufacturing activity was done through processing 
imported components. Therefore, manufacturing was heavily 
dependent upon imports. The items of export consisted of primary 
products. The rate of increase in export was very low. The 
traditional agricultural sector was still stagnant. The 
structure of manufacturing relied upon imports. Therefore, the 
growth of manufacturing resulted in the increase of imports. The 
link between the agricultural sector and manufacturing sector 
failed to increase the demand in manufactur ing due to the 
stagnation of production in agriculture. The manufacturing sector 
obtained raw materials abroad rather than from the agricultural 
sector. During this period, the role of the manufacturers was to 
absorb the labor surplus in the agricultural sector. The supply 
of consumer goods reached the limit of the demand of the domestic
»Ibid.
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market. Therefore, investment decreased markedly and production 
activity dropped rapidly.
During this period, the rate of economic annual growth 
was five percent. The growth rate of per capita income was 2.1 
percent. The activity of import substitution did not contribute 
to the economic growth, but this period gave the opportunity to 
produce industrial labor and increase the ability of the 
industrial entrepreneur. Toward the end of the 1950's , production 
activity began to decrease gradually because of the limited size 
of the domestic market. The Korean government tried to overcome 
this stagnation by encouraging business firms to export their 
products. Exports began to have an important meaning in South 
Korea from that time and labor intensive products were 
exported. Since labor costs in Korea were low, Korean products 
could be sold very cheaply in the international market. Some 
business firms made products for exports only. Exports gave 
business firms opportunities for growth. Therefore, the exports 
in South Korea became indispensable to the business and the 
government.
Export Substitution Growth Per iod(1965- )
The year of 1965 was a turning point in the Korean
b id , P . 401 .
"̂Annua 1 Report of National Income, Bank of Korea, 1968-1975
8
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economy. After 1965 Korea experienced rapid economic 
growth. Through this period industrial entrepreneurs got more 
experienced. This fact could be a good resource for the economic 
growth in Korea.
By 1965 businessmen knew that Korean firms could produce 
labor intensive products. These products were sold very cheaply 
in foreign countries. Korean businessmen began to utilize exports 
in order to maximize profits rather than temporarily overcome a 
recession. After 1965, the GNP in Korea increased rapidly with 
the rapid growth of the exports. This means that the increase of 
exports contributed to the growth of Korean economy. From 1965 to 
1975, the annual economic growth rate was 10.5 percent and the 
annual growth rate of per capita income was 8.6 percent.® During 
this period the portion of the agricultural sector in the GNP 
decreased from 44.5 percent to 25.4 percent. But the portion of 
the manufacturing sector in the GNP increased from 28.1 percent 
to 30.8 percent. These data indicate that manufacturing in Korea 
became more important than agriculture.
Exports played an important role in the period of export 
substitution growth. According to Korea's 4th economic 
development p 1a n <1977-1981), the exports were led by labor 
intensive products. Also the government tried to develop 
electronics and shipbuilding technology in that period.
^Korean Industry, Bank of Korea, 1975.
9
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The Role of the Government in Economic Development
The government played an extremely important role in the 
rapid growth of the Korean economy. The government made Korean 
entrepreneurs participate in international trade and provided a 
critical momentum to modernize industry."^ As a result, Korea 
began to have the capacity to manufacture automobiles.
The government intervened and interfered in every area of 
economic activity such as planning and suggesting long-term 
economic policies, selecting firms and sites for a certain 
projects, financing, ensuring market shares and even sometimes 
determining wage guidelines for the private sector. The Korean 
government controls the economy more strong 1 y than any other free 
economy country.
The government policy put its utmost emphasis on growth 
and export. It kept a relatively passive attitude toward the 
regulation of monopoly or oligopoly and the improvement of income 
distribution and of industrial relations. As a result, big 
business groups arose and the income gap between the rich and the 
poor increased.
The Korean government carried out an income policy 
against raising wages and salaries in order to maintain low costs 
in manufactur ing. Especially, the government exercised an 
exclusive power on the rationing of bank loans, and this, some
‘’Seoul National University, Exported-Led Industrialization 
and Wages and Labor Conditions in Korea, Seoul, Korea, 1986, P. 
10 .
10
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argue» became an obstacle to the sound development of the banking 
industry. Big business groups had always been treated as the
core of economic policy objectives and many medium and small size 
firms, farmers, and industrial workers were neglected.
The role of government was thought to be positive at the 
beginning stage of economic development, but the negative aspects 
grew to be significant as time passed. Recently, the governmental 
economic policy began to change toward honoring opinions of lower 
classes. To reduce business concentration, the government 
strengthened enforcement of regulation against monopolistic and 
oligopolistic firms. Encouragement of business activities for 
medium and small firms has been a big concern of the government 
since 1980. This policy was due to the growth of skilled labor 
intensive industries like shipbuilding, automobiles, machinery, 
and electronics, and to the need for the integration of medium 
and small firms with large assembling firms.
However, the agriculutral sector reserved lower priority 
in investment, and traditional farming declined with growing 
trends of dairy and vegetable farming. Real wages have been 
steadily increased, although there remains a wage differential 
among workers. It is noted that the improvement of industrial 
relations has unduel y been delayed. In spite of the demands of 
workers and trade unions, the government hesitated to improve 
industrial relations, which ensures the equal footing of both
i'=>Seoul National University, Export-Led Industrialization 
and Wages and Lobor Conditions in Korea, Seoul, Korea, 1986,
P. 11.
1 1
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parties. With industrial welfare being continuously emphasized by 
the government and employers» collective activities by trade 
unions continuously have been discouraged. So the status of 
workers remains low. Thus, although the economic growth rate is 
high, the level of wages in Korea cannot be increased rapidly.
The low labor cost gives Korean firms a competitive advantage 
when Korean products are sold in the foreign market.
The Current Status of the Korean Economy
South Korea has made enormous strides in economic
growth. Its gross national output of $81 billion is already 
larger than that of half the members of the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation & Development, the Paris-based club of 24 
industrial democrac ies.  ̂ Korea’s raw industrial muscle has
pushed it ahead of such OECD members as Austria, Belgium, Greece,
and Norway, and it is closing in on Sweden.
In Korea, there are big four business groups which are 
the core of the Korean economy. They are Hyundai, Daewoo, 
Lucky-Gold Star, and Samsung. Each business group owns several 
big companies. For example, Daewoo Motor Company belongs to 
Daewoo business group. A dozen of these companies control 
virtually every aspect of Korea’s economy. Sales of the four
*’=*-"The Koreans Are Coming," Business Week, Dec. 23, 1985,
P. 47.
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largest business groups are equivalent to 45 percent of the 
nation’s G N P , making them the motor of its export drive.
Koreans cannot escape doing business with the 
Japanese. Despite deep antagonism toward the Japanese» Koreans 
respect the success of Japan. They have often looked to Japanese 
solutions. In the 1970’s the government encouraged the 
development of the above mentioned Japanese style giant trading 
companies to boost exports. Korea has obvious similarities with 
Japan in its culture and export-led economy. But the size of the 
Korean economy is one— twent ieth the size of Japan’s.
Koreans have achieved their tremendous growth at a steep 
cost. Living standards remain generally low and there is a wide 
income gap between the elite and the workers whose sacrifices 
fuel Korea’s export machine.-^® These sacrifices might become a 
powerful resource for Korea when competing with Japan in the 
U.S. market. In other words, it could give a price edge over 
Japan.
Korea’s per capita income has risen from $80 in 1965 to 
$2044 in 19B4.^'* Korea appears to be able to achieve the higher 
growth it’s seeking for the rest of the century.
t^Ibid.
1 :=)I b i d .
i-^£conomic Planning Board, Maior Statistics of Korean 
Economy, 1985.
13
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CHAPTER IV 
KOREAN AUTO INDUSTRY
The Korean auto industry consists of the passenger car 
sector and the non-passenger car sector. However, only the 
passenger car sector is considered in this paper.
There are two companies which produce passenger cars. They 
are Hyundai Motor Company and Daewoo Motor Company. Table IV-1 
shows the domestic market share of two motor companies.
Hyunda i 
Daewoo
Table IV-1 
Domestic Market Share(Uni t : percent) 
1984 1985
74 .2
25.8
69.5
30.5
* Imported cars were excluded in the table. 
(source : Car Industry» Hyundai Motor Company» 1986)
Existing Automakers and New Companies in Passenger Car Sector
As mentioned above » two big Korean companies have produced 
passenger cars in South Korea. The demand for passenger cars in 
Korea has increased gradually. Two other companies plan to enter 
the passenger car market. One of them is Kia, which has produced
14
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non—passenger cars. The other is Samsung, which is one of the 
largest business groups in South Korea.
Kia has a plan to make 120,000 passenger cars with the 
technical assistance from Mazda in 1987; 85,000 of these cars 
will be sold in the U.S. market with the help of Ford and the 
rest will be sold in the domestic market.
Samsung has been preparing to impart major components from 
Chrysler. In 1988, Samsung will enter the U.S. auto market. These 
new auto companies have entry barriers. The problems they face 
are as follows. First, existing motor companies have operated 
their facilities at the level of the economies of scale» but the 
capacity of two new auto companies will not be able to reach the 
economies of scale. Samsung will produce lOO,OOO automobiles and 
Kia will make 120,000 passenger cars. Since the production level 
to reach the economies of scale in the auto industry is 300,000» 
these new companies will be at a disadvantage over the existing 
motor companies.
Second, product differentiation might be an entry 
barrier. Hyundai and Daewoo have made significant product 
differentiation. For example, product differentiation has been 
achieved through car design. Hyundai Motor Company employed 
Italian designer Giorgetto Giugiaro for its car design.
Third, government regulation is one of the entry 
barriers. The Korean government has controlled the auto industry 
very tightly- The government regulates the entry of new companies 
for the stability of the auto market.
15
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The Competition between the Two Big Motor Companies
Auto companies are very important to their business 
groups. Bales revenue from auto companies are relatively high 
compared with others. Also the contribution margin in the auto 
field is large. So auto companies play an important role in their 
business groups. Motor companies are called the "Cash Cow" in 
Korea.
Hyundai has a strong rivalry with Daewoo. The Hyundai 
business group competes with the Daewoo business group in many 
product lines. However» Hyundai is superior to Daewoo in the auto 
industry. Hyundai has the capacity to manufacture 450,000 
automobiles annually, far exceeding the level of economies of 
scale- Daewoo has the capacity to make 248,OOO cars annually, and 
does not reach the economies of scale. Therefore, Daewoo has a 
relatively high unit fixed cost. To solve these problems, it 
needs to search for a huge auto market like the United States.
In growth rate, Hyundai is dominated by Daewoo. Whereas 
the growth rate of sales in Hyundai is 15.8 percent, Daewoo’s is
19.9 percent. But the market share of Hyundai is larger than that 
of Daewoo. Table IV—2 shows the domestic market share in 1985. In 
the midsize car market, Daewoo is superior to Hyundai, but Daewoo 
is significantly inferior to Hyundai in small car market.
With respect to technology, Hyundai is is superior to 
Daewoo. The technology level can be measured by the percentage of 
components which are made in Korea. Table IV-3 shows the
16
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
technology level of two companies.
Table IV-2 
The Market Share in 1985 
Hyundai : Small Size 79.9% Medium 48.5% Total 69.5%
Daewoo : Small Size 20.1% Medium 51.5% Total 30.5%
(Source: Hyundai Management 8 6 )
Year
Table IV—3
The Percentage of Components which are Made in Korea 
Hyunda i Daewoo
84 85 84 85
Small 97 98 84 93
Midsize 97 97 72-73 89-91
(Source: Annual Publications 8 6 , Daewoo Motor Company)
Overall» Daewoo is dominated by Hyundai. Therefore, the 
Daewoo Motor Company has tried to overtake Hyundai in the 
domestic market. In order to narrow the gap, Daewoo has adopted a 
joint venture strategy. Fifty percent of Daewoo Motor Company is 
currently owned by GM .
The primary objective of Daewoo is to increase its 
domestic market share, and the next step would be to enter the
P. 65,
itïsiigig Three Get in the Gear," T ime, November 24, 1986,
17
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overseas market. Because Daewoo does not like to take risks, it 
has a plan to enter the U.S. market under the control of 
GM. Hyundai, however, is very aggressive in marketing and 
actively entered the U.S. market with the abundant marketing 
expertise which it acquired in the domestic market.
18
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CHAPTER V
THE FOREIGN CAR SALES IN THE UNITED STATES
The Growth of Imported Cars in the U.S.
Imported cars have taken an important share of the 
U.S. auto market. In 1956 imported sales made up less than two 
percent of the market, and the Western United States accounted 
for thirty six percent of total U.S. foreign car registrations.^*’ 
By 1959 foreign car sales had increased to ten percent of the 
market or 614,131 units.
Toyota Motor Company pulled its cars off the U.S. auto 
market and did engineering studies of American roads. Importers 
invested in new warehouses, parts inventories, distribution and 
dealers organizations. They then started producing cars for the 
U.S. market. In 1965 Toyota introduced the Corona, which was 
designed for only the U.S. auto buyers.^®
Foreign car sales reached 1,117,700 units or 11.7 percent 
of the market in 1969. The Volkswagen accounted for 50,7 percent 
of foreign sales and Toyota replaced formerly second place Opel
*
'*-Joan Walsh, "High Tide for Foreign Cars," Federal Bank of
San Frans i sco Monthly Review, September, 1970, P. 182.
''TDavid L. Louis, "Automobile Industry," Col 1ier's 
Encvc1ooedia Vol. Ill, P. 357.
t(3»"0etro i t Races to Meet Challenges of Imports," Bus i ness
Week, March 29, 1969, P. 106.
19
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in s a l e s . F o r d  introduced the Maverick and AMC introduced the 
Hornet in an attempt to stem the sales increase of imports. As 
the market for subcompacts increased, the U.S. motor companies 
coped with that situation. But importers introduced even smaller» 
less expensive cars such as the Datsun 1200 and Toyota 
Corolla. The competition between foreign auto companies and the 
U.S. companies became more intense.
By late 1971 U.S. auto sales were up 24.1 percent, but 
foreign car sales were even better ; foreign car dealers sold 
138,000 cars in March 1971 for a new record
The penetration by Japanese cars into the U.S. auto 
market since the oil embargo of 1974 has been impressive. Every 
year new motor vehicle sales of Japanese vehicles increased 
significantly. In June, 1975, Toyota moved ahead of Volkswagen, 
and Datsun surpassed Volkswagen the following year. Honda became 
the third largest importer in 1978, and Mazda surpassed 
Volkswagen in 1978.
In 1980, Toyota and Datsun each sold more than half a 
million units in the United States, followed by Honda with 
375,252. Honda’s penetrating strategy has been working remarkably 
well, and it ranked top in sales per outlet in 1979, followed by
 ̂"^av i d L. Lewis, "Automobile Industry," Co 11i e r ’s 
Encvc1ooed i a Vol. Ill, P. 131.
^‘̂ "Sales of U.S. Cars Soared in Late March, But Foreign 
Makes Set Record in Month," Wall Street Journal, April 5, 1971,
P. 1 .
Automotive News, 1980 market Data Book issue, 1980, P. 46.
20
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Toyota and Datsun
Japanese auto makers have provided American customers 
with the right product» at the right time and right price» 
through the right channel of distribution, and with satisfactory 
after-service.®^ In the 1970’s and the early 1980's, American 
drivers wanted fuel-efficient small vehicles of high 
quality. While American motor makers have never been greatly 
successful in producing this type of vehicle, or » more 
accurately, have been reluctant to do so for various reasons, the 
Japanese have been successful in providing such products through 
innovation and improvement.®''-^ In other words, Japanese auto 
makers have succeeded in the meeting American consumer's needs 
and wants.
Mazda has supplied ro tary-eng i ne vehicles, and Toyota 
introduced a five-speed transmission, for better economy and 
quieter operation in 1972. Toyota changed its vehicles to produce 
more fue1-efficiency and powerful front-whee1 drive.
The market share of imported cars(sa les) in the United 
States was 26.98 percent in 1980, up from 21.89 percent in 
1979. Japanese vehicles accounted for 75.95 percent of these 
vehicles in 1979» and for 79.62 percent in 1980. Japanese cars 
accounted for 16.62 percent of the total U.S. auto market in 1979
Ibid.
®=*Chang » C . S., The Japanese Auto Industrv and U.S. Market . 
New York: Prager Publishers, 1981, P. 147.
R'* Ibid .
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and for 21 .48 percent in 1980 In other words, one out of five
cars sold in the United States in 1980 was Japanese. At the end 
of February, 1981, popular Japanese motor makers maintained the 
following market share in the U.S. auto market : Toyota 7.6%, 
Datsun 5.5%, and Honda 4.6%. Table 9— 1 shows the percentage of 
imported vehicles and Japanese vehicles in the United States.
T<able V—1
Market Share of Imported and Japanese Cars in the U.S.
1973 1974 1976 1978 1979 1980
Imported Cars/Total MKT 15.1 15.7 14.8 17.8 22.6 26.7
Japan/Imported Cars 42.4 47.7 64.4 69.7 75.6 79.6
Japan/Total Market 7.9 8.0 9.6 12.4 17.0 21.3
(Source: Automotive News, Detroit Marketing Service
1973-1980)
As shown in the above table, the market share of Japanese cars in 
the United States has continuously increased. In the 1980's this 
trend continued. Table 9-2 shows the strong market share of 
Japanese motor companies in the U.S. auto market. The data show 
that Japanese motor companies held the first place in the foreign 
car market of the United States. Compared with West Germany which 
has the second place in that time, Japan has significant market
■̂̂ Automo t i ve News, March 2, 1981, P. 6.
. L . Po Ik, Import Passenger Car Service "K" 
Report(Detroit: R. L. Polk, 1981), P. 2.
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share(80.3 percent Vs 11.7 percent).
Table V—2
Impoted Cars in the United States (1933)
Number Imported cars/Total cars Country/imported Cars 
Japan 1,915,623 20.9% 80.3%
W. Germ. 279,400 3.0 % 11.7%
Others 190,590 2.1 % 8.0%
Total 2,385,613 26% 100%
(Source : Hyundai Management 8 4 )
From West Germany and Yugoslayia to Japan and South 
Korea, foreign cars are exported to the United States. Battered 
in the early 1980's by recession and imports, G M , Ford and 
Chrysler were bolstered by short term protectionist measures, 
chiefly the imposition of "Voluntary" export restraints on the 
J a p a n e s e . B y  1984 the Big three had rallied to their highest 
profit 1eye1 eyer: $9.8 billion in all. But protectionism began 
unwinding; the Reagan Administration stopped forcing quotas on 
Japan in 1985. Eyen though the Japanese uni laterally imposed 
their own ceiling on the number of cars exported to the U.S. that 
year, the quota was a full 24 percent higher than the one for the 
year before. In 1985 Detroit’s collectiye profits shrank a bit
" The Big Three Get in Gear," T i me, Nov. 24, 1986, P . 64.
^«»Ibid .
'̂ "̂ Ibid .
23
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
to $8.1 billion.
In line with the increasingly competitive climate, some 
Wall Street analysts expect Detroit’s share of the U.S. auto 
market to shrink from 68 percent to as little as 55 percent by 
1990, West German luxury carmaker BMW and Mercedes-Benz enjoyed a 
banner year in 1986. Although the totals are small, the exports 
are in the highly profitable $20,000 to $60,000 price range and 
skim off a nice portion of the cream of the American market. 
Sweden’s Saab and Volvo and Britain’s Jaguar enjoyed record 
export sales in 1985.
At the opposite end of the price scale, South Korea’s 
Hyundai made a dazzling debut in 1986. The $4,995 subcompact 
sold 168,882 units in that year. Much less successful was the 
case of Yugo, a remodeled Fiat that sells for $3,990 and is 
billed as the cheapest new car in the U.S. market.®*- In 1986, 
only 28,000 units of the Yugo were so Id.
Japanese motor companies exported to the U.S. 2.3 million 
vehicles in 1986. That was a formidable achievement, considering 
that the value of the Japanese Yen was more than 20 percent 
higher in relation to the U.S. dollar than it was in 1985. This 
fact resulted in the increase of an average production cost up to 
$1,300 to Japanese motor companies.
The invasion of foreign cars has changed the environment 
of the U.S. automobile market. The U.S. auto companies try to
®‘>Ibid.
3»ib id.
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collaborate with strong foreign motor companies in order to 
defend their market share against foreign auto makers. In fall, 
1986, as Toyota started annual production of 50,000 of its peppy 
Corolla FX-16 at a joint-venture plant in Fremont, California, it 
was also assembling 200,000 Chevy Novas for GM. Ford, which since 
1979 has owned 25% of Mazda, has agreed to buy up to 50% of the 
output of that company’s Michigan plant, to be so Id as part of 
the Mustang series. Chrysler and Mitsubishi have a joint project 
known as Diamond Star, which will begin building cars in 
Bloomington, Illinois by late 1988.
The Motivation of Buying Imported Cars in the U.S.
There are several reasons that Americans buy imported 
cars, especially Japanese style cars. First, Japanese style cars 
are very economical. In other words, they are very 
fuel-efficient. After the fuel crisis in the 1970’s , American 
people have become more sensitive to the price of gas. Second, 
the prices of imported cars are usually lower than those of 
American cars, and the product quality is not less than that of 
the U.S. car. These factors attract American customers.
Third, people who want to differentiate themselves from others 
buy imported cars. They are better educated, better paid, more 
sophisticated, and younger than average car buyers. Fourth, there
3j»Ibid .
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is a definite trend to prefer smaller cars in the United 
States. Since most imported cars are small, people have come to 
prefer foreign cars.
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CHAPTER VI
THE MOTIVATIONS AND STRATEGIES OF KOREAN MOTOR COMPANIES IN THE 
U.S. MARKET
The Big U.S. Auto Market
The United State is the biggest auto market. No other 
country has a car demand like the U.S. Lloyd Reuss, an executive 
vice president at G M , has a clear view of the prospect. He says, 
"The good news is that North America is the only automobile 
market in the world where there is a good shot at a profit."
In 1984, the demand for automobiles increased remarkably 
in the United States. The demand for cars in 1984 was 10,390,000 
units and the number of passenger cars sold in 1983 was 
9j180,918, of which 3,190,000 were subcompacts. The percentage of 
subcompacts among total cars sold in the United States was 35 
percent ; so a huge subcompact market has existed in the 
U.S. These facts might motivate Korean auto makers to enter the 
U.S. market. Table VI-1 shows the situation of the U.S. auto 
market in 1983-1984.
In 1983, the number of imported passenger cars was about 
2,380,000, of which 1,150,000 units were subcompact cars. The 
subcompact cars accounted for 40 percent of the total imported 
cars in 1984 and the imported cars accounted for 36 percent of 
the total U.S. subcompact car market in the same year. This fact 
means that the subcompact market is very important to the foreign
27
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Table VI-1 
The Number of Cars Sold in the U.S.
Production Place 1984______% in Total____1983______% in Total
U.S.A. 6,795,299 74 5,756,658 72.1
Import 2,385,613 26 2,223,087 27.9
Total 9,180,912 100 7,979,745 100
(Source : Hyundai Management 8 5 )
car makers. The following data indicate the size of the U.S. car 
market.
Table VI-2
The Analysis on the Automotive Market in the U.S.
1984_____ % in Total______ 1983_______% in Total
Subcompac t 2,034,807 29.8 1,738,590 30.2
Compact 924,639 13.6 1,104,080 19.2
Intermediate 2,247,042 33. 1 1,168,080 28-1
Fu11 Size 1,157,519 17. 1 928,467 16. 1
Luxury 431,292 6.4 367,441 6.4
To ta 1 6,795,299 100 5,756,658 lOO
* Tmnnrted cars were excluded in the tab le
(Source: Hyundai Manaoement 85 )
The above data show that the percentage of small cars produced in 
the U.S. decreased in 1984 compared with 1983. In the small car 
market, the share of imported cars increased during that
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period. This fact presented a good opportunity for Korean motor 
companies to enter the U.S. auto market because these companies 
mostly produce subcompact cars.
The Role of the Korean Government
The role of the Korean government has been considered 
critical in Korea’s economic development. The Korean economy i s , 
in nature, an export-led economy. With the construct ion, textile, 
and shipbuilding industries in a deep crisis, and Europe and 
Japan blocking Korean goods with trade barriers, the Korean 
government feels it has no choice but to go head-to-head with 
Japanese and American manufacturers in the rich U.S. market. 
Hyundai’s arrival in the U.S. was a national event for South 
Korea. The Korean government is deeply interested in the 
U.S. automotive market. Kum Jin-Ho, Secretary of Trade & Industry 
in South Korea said, "You will see that the service will be 
perfect when the first cars are sold in the U.S." The Korean 
government actively has supported the export of automobiles into 
the U.S. market.
South Korea lacks natural resources. It imports a great 
deal of oil and foods. The large amount of imports has resulted 
in the constant deficit of i nternat i onal trade. In addition.
s»3"The Koreans Are Coming," Business Week, Dec. 23, 1985
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South Korea has more than $45 billion foreign debt In order to 
overcome these problems, the country needs to increase 
exports. Since car exports have a good potential, the government 
has strongly encouraged Korean auto makers to enter the 
U.S. mar ket.
The Motives Korean Motor Companies have in the U.S. Market
South Korea has a population of 40,000,000. But there are 
only 500,000 automobiles. The car market in Korea is too small, 
so Korean motor companies cannot rely on only the domestic 
market. Korean auto makers selected the United States market 
because it is big enough to satisfy the production of Korean 
motor companies. In order to maintain economies of scale, Korean 
motor companies need to secure the U.S. auto market.
One of the main advantages Korean motor companies have 
in the U.S. is the cheap labor cost. Korean auto workers earn 
$2.50 an hour while Japanse auto workers earn $15 an hour and 
American auto workers earn $25 per h o u r T h e  remarkably cheap 
labor cost has enabled Hyundai to set its price as the second 
cheapest in the United States. The low price is the most 
important advantage Hyundai has in the U.S. market.
Japanese motor companies conceded a share of the market
Ib id .
3E5i*The Big Three Get in Gear," Time, Nov. 24, 1986, P. 65
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to the Koreans and to another low priced model from Yugoslavia 
and the Soviet Union.®* Toyota and Honda rapidly built bigger» 
more luxurious cars in part to avoid head-on competition with the 
new arrivals.
The economic pressures such as the rising value of the 
Yen» have continued to force the Japanese to concentrate on more 
expensive goods. As the Japanese companies keep moving upmarket» 
the Koreans can move in and take over the subcompact car market 
which was occupied by Japanese motor companies.
The Export Drive by Hyundai
It should come as no surprise that South Korea is staking 
its economic future on an automobile made by one of its giant 
cong lomerates > the Hyundai group.®"'' That is the way West Germany 
stormed the U.S. in the 1950's with Volkswagen; it's the way 
Japan did it in the 1970’s with Toyota. And it’s the way Korea 
must go if it is finally to break out of the cheap labor syndrome 
of steel » textiles, shoes, and stuffed toys and join the club of 
modern industrial nations.
In 1976, Hyundai accounted for 57.0 percent of the 
domestic market in Korea. It has maintained its leading status
P. 46,
=»*Busi ness Week , Dec . 16, 1 985 .
rav'The Koreans Are Coming," Business Week, Dec. S3, 1985,
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since it was founded in 1967. But from 1980 to 1982 the sales 
revenue was below that of 1979 because of the oil shortage. In 
1983 the Korean auto industry had a boom year because the demand 
of the domestic market increased remarkably. Since then, Hyundai 
has tried to increase productivity and to develop its own 
model. It has continued to make an effort to have the capacity 
for mass production. In its early days, Hyundai made the Ford 
Cortina, which was assembled from kits supplied by Ford. In 1976, 
Hyundai began to make the Pony, which was developed by Hyundai 
Motor Company. In February, 1976, Hyundai exported five units of
Pony to Ecuador for the first time. After that, the company sold 
its automobiles to the Middle East and Central America. In 1978 
Hyundai passed the MIRA test < Safety test), which was executed in 
Great Britain. Therefore, Hyundai could enter the European 
market. In 1984, it passed the Safety test in Canada.
In 1985, Hyundai began to export its Pony Excel, a small 
car, to Great Britain and Canada. As soon as Pony Excel was 
exported to Canada, it obtained big popularity, as reflected 
by its taking 11 percent share of the Canadian market. Its 
success exceeded by five times the original goal set by 
Hyundai. The Canadian market is not as big as the United States ; 
it is as big as that of the market of California, which is 1/10 
of the total U.S. market. The major reason that Hyundai entered 
the Canadian market was to prepare for entering the 
U.S. market. In September, 1985, Hyundai sold 57,539 units in 
Canada and it was the top sale record in that year. Honda, which
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sold 41 ,726, was overtaken by Hyundai Motor Company in Canada. 
Hyundai Motor Company obtained great confidence in international 
marketing because it overwhelemed Honda, the top selling imported 
car in Canada, in just 18 months
Protectionism in the world blocked the growth of exports 
of Korea in the mid 1980's . Hyundai sold its Pony Excel in 
Britain for two years through International Ltd., a holding 
company for the Hyundai and Subaru franchises. Hyundai 
originally planned to sell 10,000 units, but the European 
Community slapped a limit on the number which could be imported 
duty free. However, the United States never imposed any 
constraints on the Hyundai Motor Company. Therefore, the exports 
of automobiles into the united States, which is a relatively open 
market, could overcome export problems. Hyundai has had a keen 
interest in the big U.S. market because the demand of 
U.S. automotive market is as much as one third of the demand in 
the world auto market Hyundai has concentrated every effort to 
export its cars to the United States. Hyundai’s Pony Excel began 
to roll into the U.S. at the port of Jacksonville, Florida in 
January, 1986.
^ "̂Japanese Automotive News, Oc t . 14, 1985 .
3 <5MI Koreans are Coming," Business Week, Dec. 83, 1986, P. 49
New Wave of Small Cars Headed for U.S. Showrooms," 
Business Week, July, 1984, P .37.
'̂ T̂he Prospect of Structure in Manuf ac tur i nq and the 
Strateov for the Develoomenmt, Korean Industrial Economic 
Institute, Oct 16, 1985.
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Hyundai’s Target Market in the U.S. and its Dbiectives
The target market of Hyundai in the United States is the 
subcompact car sector. Hyundai Motor Company had made an analysis 
of the competition before it entered the U.S. market. In the 
luxury car market, the U.S. big three and European car makers 
occupied the market. Benz, BMW, Audi, Porche and Jaguar had 36 
percent of the market share of the U.S. luxury car market in
1984. The price range was $18,000 to $40,000. Japanese motor 
companies have planned to enter the luxury car market or midsize 
car mar ket. In the midsize car market there is severe 
competition between Japan and the U.S. automakers. In the small 
car market, the U.S. companies are at a disadvantage compared 
with Japanese motor companies or Korean motor companies due to 
price. Hyundai was able to set a low price, so it could 
participate in the U.S. market owing to price, even though the 
quality of Hyundai’s Pony Excel is lower than that of a Japanese 
or American car.
The short-term objective of Hyundai Motor Company in the
U.S. market is to make a high quality car with a low cost. Its
car should be quoted at a low price. The most important thing for 
Hyundai is to maintain a low cost that results from cheap labor 
costs. The long-term objective is to increase product quality and 
to increase the safety level. The fundamental goal for Hyundai is
to become a leading automaker in the world.
+̂̂ Jaoanese Automotive News, April 13, 1985.
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The Way of Entry into the U.S. Market by Hyundai
The export of Hyundai’s Pony Excel was dependent upon car 
dealers in the Canadian market. As the demand for Pony Excel 
increased in Canada, Hyundai set up Hyundai Motor Canada, which 
is a marketing agent. There are 160 car dealers which deal with 
only Hyundai’s Pony Excel in Canada.
Hyundai set up Hyundai Motor America» which is located 
in Los Angeles, for their entry into the U.S. in April,
1905. There are some reasons for setting up a subsidiary.
First, Hyundai had assistance from Ford in the 1970’s . It may 
have tried to get help from Ford in marketing. Since Hyundai 
wanted to own ICO percent of the management in the foreign 
operation, it decided not to get any assistance from Ford in the 
U.S. auto market. Although Mitsubishi gives some technical 
assistance, it cannot participate in the management of 
Hyundai. Ford proposed that it sell Pony Excel in the 
U.S. market, but Hyundai declined the offer. For marketing in the
U.S. Hyundai decided to utilize their experience from the
Canadian market. Even though this decision brings about some 
risks, Hyundai Motor Company chose that method because it 
preferred independence in the U.S. market.
Second, cooperation with the U.S. motor companies may 
result in a disadvantage. For example, if Pony Excel is sold as a 
Ford brand in the United States, this fact prevents Hundai from
growing to a leading motor company in the world.
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Third, the successful cases of Japanese motor companies 
gave a guideline to Hyundai. Japanese motor companies secured 
their own distribution channels and through excellent 
after-services they satisfied the needs and wants of American 
customers. Hyundai decided to follow this success stories.
Hyundai divided the U.S. market into three regions, which 
are East, West and South. The western part is controlled by the 
subsidiary which is located in Los Angeles and the eastern part 
is controlled by the district headquarters which is located in 
New Jersey. The southern part is controlled by the district 
headquarters located in Atlanta. These three locations are close 
to ports, so it is convenient for Hyundai to transport cars into 
the U.S. auto market. Hyundai considered weather, income level, 
population and transportation in the early entry. The western and 
southern regions are in the sunbelt. In these parts, weather is 
mild, so the weather condition is very good for a car 
engine. Since the engine of Hyundai’s Pony Excel is not strong 
enough to survive in cold weather, Hyundai Motor Company had to 
choose these mild areas. A lot of businesses have shifted to the 
mild area, so population of these areas increased. Therefore, the 
demand has grown in these parts. According to World Automotive 
Year Book, the number of total cars sold in the U.S. was 
10,118,000 in 1984. 1 ,006,000 cars were sold in California in
the same year. California is the biggest auto market in the 
United States. Florida, Texas, New Jersey and Maryland are
‘'•■■̂Ulor Id Automotive Year Book , 1985.
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important markets. The following data show the sales of brand new 
cars in the United States.
Table VI-3 
The Sales of Automobiles in 1984
Rank State No . of Cars Sold The Rate of Annual Increa
1 . Calif. 1,006,000 9. 1 percent decrease
2. New York 685,000 1.7 percent i ncrease
3. Florida 652,000 10.6 percent increase
4. Texas 651,000 10.7 percent i nc rease
5. 11 1i no i s 573,000 12.3 percent i ncrease
6 . Michigan 552,000 14.0 percent i ncrease
7. Oh i o 518,000 20.0 percent i ncrease
8. Pennsy1vania 512,000 11 .6 percent i ncrease
9. New Jersey 433,000 23.8 percent i ncrease
10. Maryland 282,000 11.5 percent increase
(Source : World Automotive Year Book , 1985)
Hyundai Motor Company is deeply interested in the eastern 
part of the United States. Detroit and Chicago are big industrial 
cities. Hyundai thinks that success in these cities can improve 
its image» but their products are not ready for the cold weather 
market. Hyundai will need to improve its engine and get some 
information about the automobile market from these big cities 
before marketing their cars there.
Strong marketing activity has been considered critical
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•for Hyundai in the United States. It studied the success cases of 
Japanese motor companies very carefully and hired former 
marketing managers of Toyota. Hyundai Motor Company employed 
Americans as salesmen. Dealers have been controlled by 
distributors. Distributors have been controlled by the marketing 
department of Hyundai Motor America.
Hyundai’s Marketing Plan
A . Pricing
Hyundai decided the price of its car based upon those of 
competitors in the U.S. market» considering the size of engine 
and type of vehicles. First, Hyundai set the consumer price, then 
it calculated the margin for the dealer, the margin for the sales 
agent, and custom duties. Finally the company determined the 
price on a F.O.B. basis. The price can be changed, depending 
upon the economic situation and the pricing strategies of 
competitors. Hyundai set a very low price, which is $4995. This 
low price was considered extremely important in the success of
1986. Hyundai Motor Company sold 168,882 units in that 
year. Hyundai adopted the strategy of high-quality and low 
price. This strategy could be a competitive edge in the 
U.S. market. In the Canadian market, the high-quality and low 
price strategy enabled Hyundai to overtake Honda in 18 months.
Hyundai employed three marketing specialists who had
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consulted for Toyota Motor Company. Hyundai set the price below 
the minimum prices of Japanese cars, following the suggestions of 
these marketing consultants.
B . Advert is irîKg Strategy
In the beginning of 1985» Hyundai hired farmer Toyota 
officers who have a great deal of knowledge in the American 
automotive market. In June, 1986» Hyundai set up the advertising
department in Hyundai Motor America and employed the advertising 
agency Becker & Sp i evoge1, which is located in New York» paying 
$25,000,000. Becker & Sp i evoge1 has promoted the image of Hyundai 
in the United States.
When Hyundai entered the Canadian market» it spent 
$3,000,000 in the first year. In the U.S. market » Hyundai spent 
more than eight times that amount. The reason is that Hyundai was 
not well known in the United States » although it is the 37th 
largest firm in the world.
Hyundai Motor Company has used dealers for its 
advertising. Through car dealers» Hyundai can promote its 
image and is able to get some imformat ion about consumers’ needs 
and market situation.
C. Biraindl INIame
Hyundai has two types of cars. One is called "Pony 
Excel". The other is called "Stellar"» which was designed by
39
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Italy's Giorgetto Gi ug i aro In the case of Pony Excel , the
brand name is expressed as "HD PONY". For Stellar, it is 
expressed as "HD STELLAR" . These expressions are always the 
same regard less of country because Hyundai Motor Company set a 
goal for the world market.
"Hyundai", pronounced Hee-Un’-day in Seoul, will be 
softened to rhyme with "Sunday" in the U.S. The most important 
thing in the brand name policy is to establish a high-quality 
image.
D. Producit Strategy
Hyundai developed the new type of small car— Pony 
Excel. The motivation in the development was as follows.
First, the demand pattern for automobiles has changed. After the 
oil crisis, small and economical cars have been preferred. 
Second, Japanese automakers began to concentrate on midsize cars 
for higher profit rather than to continue in the small car 
market.
Hyundai has tried to make its cars of quality as high as 
those of Japanese cars. Hyundai Motor Comapny adopted the front 
wheel drive type, which saves 20 percent more gas over other 
types of cars. In January, 1984, Hyundai passed the safety test 
in Canada. In 1985, it passed Federal Motor Vehicle Safety
A New Wave of Small Cars is Headed for U.S. Showrooms, " 
Business Week, July 9, 1984.
"=HD is used to signify Hyundai.
40
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Standards(FMVSS) in the United States. Pony Excel is already 
launched into the U.S. market. Stellar is expected to be sold in
1987.
E. Dealerslhip
Dealers are extremely important for success in the 
U.S. market. Hyundai has secured 150 dealers. These dealers 
thought that Hyundai would give a higher margin to them. Hyundai 
requested dealers to set up a showroom for only Hyundai. It 
offered an 8 to IS percent margin of average selling 
price. Hyundai Motor Company plans to have its own dealerships 
throughout the United States. If Hyundai has its own dealerships, 
it will be in a better position to compete with Japanese motor 
compan i e s .
F. Goaramtee amd Aften— Service
Hyundai determined its strategy about after-service and 
guarantee based upon those of competitors. The guarantee period 
is six months after the sale, and is one year after the 
shipment. One officer in the maintenance department in Hyundai 
Motor Company said, "We are trying to decrease the guarantee 
period because it contributes to the cost increase."
For after—serVic e , Hyundai has employed American 
technicians instead of sending its employees from Seoul. Since
'^'^Seoul National University, A Studv on the Korean Auto 
Industrv, Seoul, Korea, 1986, P. 102.
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Hyundai exports its cars to 67 countries, it is not easy to send 
technicians to the United States.
The Export Drive by Daewoo Mo tor Company
Daewoo Motor Company has not had any international 
marketing experience. However, General Motors has actively 
supported Daewoo’s entry into the United states. GM can help 
Daewoo in marketing and technology. Similarly, Daewoo can offer 
cheap labor forces, so GM might be able to compete with Japanese 
motor companies with lower prices by using Korean workers. The 
cooperation between two companies can eliminate competitors in 
the U.S. market.
Koreans see themselves as a crucial ally in helping 
American companies compete with Japanese. Korean companies signed 
dozens of agreements combining U.S. technology with cheap, 
disciplined Korean labor to make products that compete with 
Japan ’ s .
Daewoo Motor Company can easily enter the U.S. market 
with the help of GM. Also, Daewoo is able to avoid the 
protectionism of the United States since it uses G M ’s 
distribution channels and service systems. GM might be able, 
through cooperation with Daewoo Motor Company, to recover the 
subcompact market which was lost by Japanese motor companies.
■^■^"Koreans Are Coming," Business Week, Dec. 23, 1985, P. 51.
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In 1986» Daewoo and GM made an agreement whereby GM 
supplies technology to Daewoo and sells Daewoo's subcompact which 
is called LeMans, in the U.S. market. 100,000 units of LeMans 
will be sold through the Pontiac Division in 1987. The style of 
LeMans is very similar to the one which Opel developed. (Opel is 
a GM's subsidiary in West Germany.) LeMans has a front wheel 
drive system and its engine capacity is 1,500 c c . This car might 
be able to attack Japanese automobiles with its low price.
Daewoo's Short-Term and Long-Term Objectives in the U.S. Market
In the short-term, Daewoo tries to absorb advanced 
technology and expand the current facilities to meet new demand 
in the United States. In the long run, Daewoo plans to overtake 
Hyundai in the domestic market through high technology and 
sophisticated marketing expertise which will be obtained in the 
U.S. market.
The Entry into the U.S. Market by Daewoo
While Hyundai is very aggressive in international 
marketing, Daewoo is conservât!v e . Daewoo enters the U.S. market, 
using GM's distribution channels.
Daewoo has had no plan to sell its cars as its own
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brand. The reason is that the Pontiac division has an excellent 
marketing ability and good dealers throught the United States. 
Daewoo Motor Company considers the Pontiac division as its 
marketing agent. As a matter of fact, Daewoo has no marketing 
strategy in the U.S. automotive market, since the Pontiac 
division takes all responsibilities of pricing, distribution, and 
advertising. Daewoo Motor Company is unable to control its 
marketing channels in the U.S. However, Daewoo does not have to 
spend any money in marketing and is able to secure the 
U.S. market very safely.
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CHAPTER VII
THE PROBLEMS OF KOREAN MOTOR COMPANIES IN THE U.S. MARKET
Hyundai’s main problem is supply, not demand. Hyundai 
Motor Company operates for 24 hours a day to meet the demand in 
the United States. Hyundai’s work force consists of two shifts 
and each shift works for 12 hours per day.'“'<̂ Hyundai has a plan 
to expand its facilities to supply more cars to the United 
States, but management worries about the quota the
U.S. government may set in 1988. The amount of the quota will be 
the same as the amount of sales in 1987, so Hyundai has tried its 
best to export as many cars as possible to the United States.
The Daewoo does not worry about the quota problem because its 
cars are sold by the Pontiac division. The market share Daewoo 
will have in the U.S. may be very small. Daewoo has a plan to 
secure only one percent of the U.S. auto market There is 
little possibility that the U.S. government will set the quota 
for the Daewoo Motor Company. But Daewoo Motor Company may have a 
very serious problem. General Motors has had a Saturn project, 
which is its plan for a small car development. If GM succeeds in 
developing the small car which will surpass a Japanese 
automobile, GM may not import LeMans from Daewoo. In this case, 
Daewoo Motor Company will lose the U.S. market. Unless Daewoo has
^►raSeoul National University, A Study on the Korean Auto 
Industry, Seoul, Korea, 1986.
■‘'■'5’Ibid, P. 147.
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its own marketing plan in the U.S., it should give up exporting
its cars to the United States
Japanese motor companies may think that the Japanese will 
be driven out of the U.S. market by Korean motor companies 
because Korean cars are well designed and they are sold at a good 
p r i c e . A l t h o u g h  Japanese auto makers are likely to continue 
doing business with midsize cars in the U.S., some of them are 
resigned to losing shares steadily to Korean autos. Consequently, 
Korean auto makers are expected to be retaliated against by 
Japanese motor companies. In fact, Mitsubishi owns 15 percent of 
Hyundai Motor Company and provides it with major components such 
as engines and axles. If Mitsubishi stops supplying the
components to Hyundai, Hyundai will not be able to survive in the
U.S. market. In order to overcome these problems, Hyundai Motor 
Company is expected to develop its own technology and to make an 
effort to increase product quality.
Japanese motor companies have tried to set up production 
facilities in the U.S. to reduce costs. They may make subcompact 
cars and sell them with lower prices than before, which would 
threaten Hyundai’s Pony Excel. To cope with this problem, Hyundai 
might make a joint venture with Ford, which supplied the major 
components to Hyundai in the 1970’s.
Another problem the Korean motor companies have in the 
U.S. market is the entry of other developing countries like 
China, whose labor cost is much cheaper than that of South
~̂‘̂ "The Koreans Are Coming," Business Week, Dec. 23, 1985.
46
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Korea. In fact, Korea is competing against Japanese companies and 
the U.S. companies, owing to cheap labor costs. But this 
advantage cannot last long. If China enters the U.S. auto market, 
Korean motor companies will lose the price edge because China 
will be able to set a lower price than South Korea.
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CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSION
Two Korean motor companies, Hyundai and Daewoo, have 
entered the U.S. auto market. The most important motivation for 
these companies in the U.S. is to be able to sell their cars at 
low prices. Another motivation factor is the trend that American 
consumers prefer to buy small cars. Japanese motor companies 
began to develop midsize cars rather than to continue 
concentrating on the subcompact car market in the U.S. This fact 
gave Korean motor companies a good opportunity to enter the 
U.S. automotive market.
Hyundai Motor Company has had international marketing 
experience and is independent in marketing. Hyundai sells its 
cars under its own brand name, which is "HD Pony Excel". It has 
tried to control its distribution channels and to make an effort 
to advertise extensively. Hyundai has taken an aggressive 
approach in the entry to the U.S. market. Daewoo Motor Company, 
on the other hand, is risk—averse in the business. It took a 
conservative approach in entering the market. Daewoo utilizes 
G M ’s marketing channels and sells its cars as a Pontiac 
brand. Actually Daewoo takes no risks in the marketing.
The problems Hyundai has in the U.S. market are potential 
competition from other developing countr i es(e.g.,Ch i na), 
technical dependence on Mitsubishi, and the import quota. In 
order to overcome technical problems and new entry of other
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foreign companies whose labor costs are cheaper than Korea, 
Hyundai should develop its own technology and increase product 
quality. For the quota problem, Hyundai might get help from 
Ford. Hyundai Motor Company could make a joint venture with Ford 
in the United States. This strategy would enable Hyundai to 
eliminate the protectionism of the United States- Hyundai Motor 
Company could also get technical assistance from Ford instead of 
from Mitsubishi.
Even though Daewoo Motor Company does not take any risks 
in marketing, it is not certain that GM supports Daewoo in the 
long run. If GM decides not to cooperate with Daewoo, it will 
lose the U.S. market because it has been heavily dependent upon 
GM for marketing.
In this study, only two Korean motor companies were 
examined. Kia, the third largest auto maker in Korea, plans to 
export 85,000 units of automobiles in 1987. Kia has produced only 
non-passenger cars(e .g .,trucks). Now, it will try to make 
passenger cars. It will get technical assistance from Mazda and 
sell its cars by using Ford's distribution channels. A further 
study needs to be done about Kia's entry into the U.S. auto 
market.
Samsung, one of Korea’s four large conglomerates, also 
plans to participate in the U.S. auto market. In the United 
States, Samsung has been well known as a T.V. maker. Samsung will 
supply some components to Chrysler soon. Chrysler will be able to 
enjoy cheap labor costs like General Motors. There is a high
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possibility that Samsung will enter the U.S. market under the 
control of Chrysler.
In South Korea, car imparts have been prohibited since 
the early 1980's . However, the Korean government will lift the 
ban in 1988. Korean auto makers are expected to concede a share 
of the domestic market to foreign motor companies. In order to 
make up the lost market, Korean motor companies will make an 
effort to sell more cars in the foreign markets. Since the United 
States is the most attractive auto market, the Korean auto makers 
will try their best to sell their automobiles in the U.S.
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